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Abstract
This paper examines whether domestic firms benefit from foreign competition through imports and from
the presence of foreign-owned firms via spillovers in three Irish market-services sectors between 2001 and 2007.
Import competition enhances the productivity of domestic firms in two out of three market-services sectors
(transport and business activities). The effects from foreign presence are more varied. Foreign presence enhances
the productivity of domestic firms in one sector (transport) when using standard output-based measures of
productivity. After taking into account the degree of absorptive capacity of the domestic firms this spillover
effect only accrues to domestic non-importers. Using input-based measures of productivity, the paper points to
adverse effects of foreign presence as it is associated with lower capital-labour ratios and higher part-time-to-
full-time employee ratios among domestic firms in wholesale and retail trade.
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1 Introduction
Like other countries, Ireland has been actively attracting foreign direct investment for the past 25 years
or so. Most of the early foreign direct investment went into manufacturing. More recently, the services
sectors have also come into the focus of foreign investors. In 2007, foreign-owned firms still only accounted
for 3.6 per cent of firms in the Irish non-financial market-services sectors, but their shares in employment
and turnover were much higher at 20 and 36 per cent, respectively. Establishing a subsidiary abroad
is an important mode of serving customers in another country especially in services industries where
cross-border trade frequently requires the service provider and the customer to be in the same physical
location for the exchange to take place. Firms setting up subsidiaries abroad typically have a firm-specific
advantage that allows them to overcome the disadvantages associated with operating in a foreign market.
As a result foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered a major channel for international technology
diffusion (Keller, 2004). The presence of efficient foreign-owned firms is expected to raise domestic firms’
productivity through technology spillovers, by creating linkages and through competition.
In this paper I examine whether the presence of foreign-owned firms affects the productivity of domestic
firms in three non-financial market services sectors in Ireland. I further consider the effects of imports
from abroad which may also serve as a channel of technology diffusion or as a disciplining force, thus
enhancing the productivity of domestic firms. In terms of the potential productivity spillovers from foreign
subsidiaries I take into account that the effects may vary with the productivity of the domestic firms and
also with the ability of foreign-owned firms to generate spillovers. Since productivity measurement is
a difficult task in general but even more so in services, I employ input-based measures in addition to
commonly used measures of labour and total factor productivity.
A substantial literature has focussed on spillovers from foreign to domestic firms in manufacturing
industries; Go¨rg and Greenaway (2004) and Crespo and Fontoura (2007) provide surveys, Meyer and
Sinani (2009) a meta-analysis. In this body of literature there is evidence of positive, negative and
insignificant effects of foreign presence on domestic firms’ productivity. Looking also at the effect of
imports Keller and Yeaple (2009) find them to be positive for US firms, but much less robust than those
from foreign presence. For Ireland, the literature on the effects of foreign presence has found little to no
evidence of spillovers in manufacturing (Ruane and Ug˘ur, 2005; Barry et al., 2005). The impact of foreign
presence in the services sectors has not received very much attention to date. Vahter and Masso (2007)
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find some evidence of positive spillovers from foreign to domestic firms in Estonian manufacturing and
services sectors. The do not look at individual services sectors, however. An˜on Higon and Vasilakos (2011)
examine the effects of foreign presence and absorptive capacity in the British retail sector. They find a
positive effect which is larger for firms with greater absorptive capacity. The analysis here is broader in
that is covers more than just one market-services sector; and it employs alternative measures of absorptive
capacity as well as different measures related to productivity.
The measurement of productivity is an obvious concern in any spillover study. As Griliches (1992)
discusses obtaining reliable productivity measures is even more challenging in services sectors. Services
tend to be more heterogenous than goods, hence it is difficult to measure and compare output (quantities
and prices) that accrues only to the service provided. A further concern is whether intermediate inputs
can be treated in the same way in services as they are in manufacturing. To address these issues I employ
six different measures of productivity, three of which are based on turnover and three based on value
added. In addition, I also employ two input-based indicators related to productivity. This is based on the
argument by Wolff (1999) that it is more straightforward to obtain consistent measures of inputs than of
outputs in the services sectors.
The spillover literature has recognised that firms are heterogenous, hence the need to examine both
differences in the domestic firms’ ability to absorb knowledge spillovers and differences in the ability
of foreign-owned firms to generate them. The measures of absorptive capacity used in the literature
are largely based on the assumption that absorptive capacity varies with firm productivity. Distance
to the technological frontier as defined by the most productive (foreign) firm in the industry is one
example (Kokko et al., 1996; Girma et al., 2001; Blalock and Gertler, 2009). Other examples are firm’s
R&D status/intensity (Barrios and Strobl, 2002; Kinoshita, 2001) or firm’s exporting status (Barrios
and Strobl, 2002; Girma et al., 2008; Be´ke´s et al., 2009). Here, I employ distance to the technological
frontier, exporting status and importing status as measures of absorptive capacity. To examine whether
foreign-owned firms differ in their ability to generate spillovers, the literature has considered the degree
of foreign ownership (Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2002; Smarzynska Javorcik and
Spatareanu, 2008) or their trade orientation (Girma et al., 2008) or the motivation for FDI (Driffield
and Love, 2006). This paper checks whether the effects of foreign presence differ depending on the home
country of the foreign subsidiaries’ parent.
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I use an unbalanced panel of firms in the Irish services sectors that covers the period from 2001 to
2007 to examine the effects of foreign presence and competition on domestic firms in the same industry.1
Indirect competition from foreign firms via imports is associated with higher productivity of the domestic
firms in two out of three market-services sectors, namely in transport, storage and communications and
in business activities. There is evidence of positive spillover effects from foreign presence in only one
sector (transport, storage and communication) when standard output-based measures of productivity are
employed. After taking into account the degree of absorptive capacity of the domestic firms this effect only
accrues to domestic non-importers. Using input-based measures associated with productivity, the paper
shows that foreign presence is associated with reduced capital-labour ratios and higher part-time-to-full-
time employee ratios among domestic firms in wholesale and retail trade. There is suggestive evidence
that capital-labour ratios are also adversely affected by foreign presence in business activities.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the potential effects of foreign
presence on local firms. Section 3 describes the data set and the methodology. Section 4 first provides
descriptive statistics, then presents the results from fixed effects regressions and finally assesses robustness.
Section 5 briefly concludes.
2 Potential effects of foreign presence and competition
The presence of foreign-owned firms in the host economy can generate technology or knowledge spillovers
to domestic firms, but it may also have effects that are not (or not directly) associated with technology
transfer. One possible channel for spillovers is the mobility of labour from foreign to domestic firms.
Another possibility is that the physical presence of a multinational’s affiliate using a more advanced
production technology reduces the costs of learning about and adapting the new technology. This type
of effect may accrue to direct competitors (horizontal spillovers) but it may also benefit suppliers or
customers of the foreign affiliate and potentially their local competitors (vertical linkages). Another
way in which foreign presence may have an effect on the productivity of domestic firms is by introducing
additional varieties, supplying higher quality inputs or through competition. Additional competition from
efficient foreign firms may lead domestic firms to innovate and reduce inefficiencies which increases their
1Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) introduced spillovers through vertical backward and forward linkages between foreign and
domestic firms to the literature. Due to lack of detail in the available input-output tables, this paper focusses on intra-industry
(horizontal) effects of foreign presence only.
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productivity (Aghion et al., 2009). It may also mean reduced market shares for domestic firms and/or
tougher competition in input markets, in which case their measured productivity may be lower (Aitken
and Harrison, 1999). With the exception of the labour mobility channel similar effects may arise from
import competition.
As firms are heterogenous, not all foreign-owned firms may have the same potential to generate spillover
or competition effects. Similarly, the domestic firms are likely to differ in their capacity to absorb spillovers
or to cope with additional competition. The extent to which the presence of foreign affiliates impacts on
the domestic firms may depend on their degree of involvement with the local economy, i.e. the degree
of foreign ownership (Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm, 1999; Dimelis and Louri, 2002; Smarzynska Javorcik and
Spatareanu, 2008); their trade orientation (Girma et al., 2008)) or the motivation for FDI (Driffield and
Love, 2006).
Domestic firms, in turn, differ in their absorptive capacity, that is in their ability to recognise and
appropriate valuable knowledge and use it productively. In the model of Findlay (1978) technological
progress is faster in the ‘backward’ region the larger the gap between its own level of technology and
that of the ‘advanced’ region. In contrast, in Glass and Saggi (1998) the constraint for Northern firms
wanting to use advanced production technologies in the South is lower the more advanced the technological
frontier in the Southern country. This theoretical ambiguity as to whether the least or the most productive
countries/firms are most likely to benefit from FDI spillovers is also reflected in the empirical evidence.
Kokko et al. (1996) find a positive and significant spillover effect only for domestic firms with moderate
technology gaps relative to foreign firms in a cross-section of Uruguayan manufacturing firms. Girma
et al. (2001) present evidence that firms with low initial productivity levels have a slower productivity
spillover rate in a panel of UK manufacturing firms. Girma and Go¨rg (2007) show that there is a u-
shaped relationship between productivity growth and FDI interacted with absorptive capacity in the UK
electronics sector, and an increasing relationship with negative effects for the least productive firms in
engineering. Blalock and Gertler (2009) find that firms with a greater technology gap to the frontier
of the foreign-owned firms benefit more from spillovers, in addition firms with investments in R&D and
firms with higher human capital benefit more. An˜on Higon and Vasilakos (2011) estimate a positive effect
from foreign presence on the domestic firms in the UK retail sector, the effect being larger for firms with
greater absorptive capacity.
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In the majority of papers the technology gap is measured by productivity differentials between domestic
and foreign firms. Alternative measures of absorptive capacity are firm’s exporting status (Barrios and
Strobl, 2002; Be´ke´s et al., 2009) and firm’s R&D intensity (Barrios and Strobl, 2002; Kinoshita, 2001).
There is by now ample evidence that both exporters and importers are more productive than their non-
trading counterparts. Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and Wagner (2007) provide surveys of exporters
and productivity. Exporters and importers may either obtain all their information on new technologies
and products through their interactions with partners in foreign markets in which case the foreign firms
present in their home market will have little else to offer. Alternatively their outward orientation could be
an indicator that they are generally more open to learning and also more competitive which would place
them in an ideal position to learn also from the foreign firms in their home market. Barrios and Strobl
(2002) find that exporting firms benefit more from foreign presence than non-exporting firms in a panel
of Spanish manufacturing firms. They find no evidence of a differential impact depending on firm’s R&D
activity. In contrast, in Be´ke´s et al.’s (2009) panel of Hungarian manufacturing firms more productive
non-exporters benefit from horizontal and from backward spillovers. In a panel of Czech manufacturing
firms Kinoshita (2001) shows that firms which engage in R&D activity benefit more from technology
spillovers through FDI.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data and sample
The data set used in this analysis is the Annual Services Inquiry (ASI) for the Republic of Ireland for the
period 2001-2007. The ASI is conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO); it covers all firms in the
non-financial market services sectors with at least one person engaged. The sectors covered are NACE
Rev. 1.1. G (50-52) wholesale and retail trade, H (55) hotels, restaurants and bars, I (60-64) transport,
storage and communication, K (70-74) real estate, renting and business activities and O (92, 93) other
community, social and personal service activities. The ASI contains information on output, inputs, trade
and ownership at the enterprise level. The data is a census for firms with 20 or more persons engaged and
a stratified sample below this threshold with sampling probabilities increasing with firm size. Response
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to the survey is compulsory.2 On average over the period there are 11,700 firms per year varying from
9,160 firms in 2003 to 14,860 firms in 2002. The sample is representative of 86,300 firms on average with
the total number of firms increasing from 72,500 in 2001 to 95,360 in 2007.
The effects of foreign presence will be estimated for the domestic firms only, that is those firms that
are not classified as foreign in any of their years in the panel. For the analysis, I exclude NACE 2-digit
sectors 70 (real estate) and 71 (renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal
and household goods) as measures of productivity tend to be difficult to define for these sectors. I drop
firms that do not at least have one employee in full-time equivalents, that is one full-time employee or two
part-time employees. Observations from such firms account for 19 per cent of the original dataset, they are
those operated by the self-employed. Some experimentation comparing labour measured as the number
of employees to labour measured as the number of persons engaged suggests that there are systematic
differences between firms that employ labour and those that use only own labour. I further exclude firms
that are only observed twice when at least for one observation its profit margin is smaller than -1, where
profit margins are defined as turnover less wages and less purchases of goods and services over turnover.
Firms that have all negative observations for profit margin and at least one observation smaller than -1
are also dropped. Firms that are observed only once are excluded as well as NACE 3-digit industries
that have at most 5 observations in all years. Table 8 in the Appendix compares means and standard
deviations between the sample of domestic firms used and the overall population.
3.2 Empirical Specification and measurement
In estimating intra-industry spillover effects the literature typically examines whether there is a significant
effect from the share of employment or output in foreign-owned firms in an industry on the productivity of
the domestic firms in the same industry controlling for indicators of competition.3 I follow this approach
and estimate the following equation:
Prodit = α1fpiIrt−1 + α2impcompIt−1 + α3ageit−1 + α4HHIIt−1 + α5∆indtoIt−1 + λt + ²it. (1)
2Response rates are typically 70 per cent or higher.
3The analysis here is restricted to intra-industry or horizontal spillovers. I have made an attempt at also examining
the presence of backward and forward linkages constructed as described in e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik (2004). However, as
the Irish input-output tables are not disaggregated below the 2-digit NACE level, the measures obtained tend to be highly
correlated with the horizontal foreign presence measure. Including these coefficients introduces substantial noise into these
regressions making the estimates of horizontal foreign presence unreliable. In this context it is worth noting that in the vast
majority of sectors well over 50 per cent of transactions take place within the same 2-digit industries.
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The measurement of productivity Prodit and foreign presence fpiIrt is discussed in detail below. Import
competition impcompIt is another potential channel of knowledge transfer from foreign to domestic firms,
moreover it may act as a disciplining force that has a positive effect on productivity. Import competition
here is defined as the share of imports (c.i.f.) in domestic supply at basic prices plus imports in a 2-digit
NACE industry. As control variables equation (1) includes firm age (ageit) to take into account differences
between firms at different stages in their life cycle. In order to control for product market competition
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index HHIIt defined at the 3-digit industry level is included. A high HHI may
indicate a lack of competition. Foreign firms may prefer to enter fast-growing industries: to control for
this possibility industry turnover growth (∆indtoIt) is included. Detailed descriptions of the construction
and sources of all variables can be found in the Appendix. Equation (1) further includes year dummies
(λt) to control for effects that are year-specific.
A prominent way to eliminate firm-specific effects in equation (1) is to use first differences. In the
present setting this is associated with a large loss in the number of observations. Due to the stratification
process used to obtain the information on firms with less than 20 persons engaged, only a small fraction
of firms are observed every year; and while a substantial number of firms are observed more than once,
these observations do not necessarily date from consecutive years. For this reason, I estimate equation
(1) using firm-fixed effects regressions to capture firm- and industry-specific effects that are constant
over time. Firm-specific effects such as managerial ability that are observable to the firm but not the
econometrician may otherwise be correlated with productivity. Lagging the explanatory variables in order
to reduce simultaneity bias still nearly halves the sample size, but the loss in the number of observations
is not as great as it would be with first differences in combination with lagged explanatory variables. In
order to reduce potential biases due to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, the standard errors of
these regressions are clustered at the firm level.
3.3 Productivity measurement
While there are still a number of unresolved issues around productivity measurement in general, the
situation in services sectors is even more complex; Griliches (1992) provides a useful discussion. This has
to do with the lack of a widely agreed-upon definition of services, but more importantly with the difficulty
of measurement. Many services are unique or at least more heterogenous than goods; this makes it very
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difficult to measure and compare output, quantities and prices that accrues to the service provided only.
A concern for value-added based productivity measures in the services industries is whether intermediate
inputs can be treated in the same way they are treated in goods industries; and if so, which items can be
considered as intermediate inputs.4
Awaiting better measurement or concepts of productivity that work their way around these issues,
in this paper I employ a number of different productivity measures to gain an idea of the importance of
measurement. In particular, for Prodit in equation (1) I use three measures of output-based productivity,
three similarly-constructed measures of productivity based on value-added and two input-based measures.
The first productivity measure is “estimated” total factor productivity, it will be referred to as eTFPit
in the following. It is obtained as follows:
eTFPit ≡ lnTFPit = lnYit − αˆKt lnKit − αˆLt lnLit,
where Yit is turnover, Kit is capital stock and Lit is the labour input. The estimated coefficients αˆ
K
t
and αˆLt are obtained from an OLS regression where the log of turnover is regressed on the log of the
two inputs, year, 3-digit industry dummies and 2-digit industry-year interactions. In this way, the TFP
measure takes out any systematic differences in input use between sectors, across years, and also removes
industry trends. It does not impose restrictions on firm’s returns to scale. eTFPit is estimated for each
NACE letter sector separately. The alternative measure eTFPvait is obtained in a similar fashion by
using value added V Ait instead of Yit.
The second type of productivity measure is a superlative index of TFP similar to that in Griffith et
al. (2009). These indices are based on a flexible translog production function assuming constant returns
to scale and perfect competition (Caves et al., 1982a,b). Each firm’s TFP - referred to as iTFPit in the
following - is evaluated relative to the geometric mean of all other establishments in the same 3-digit
industry (averaged over all years), which serves as a reference point:
iTFPit = ln
Yit
Y¯I
− ∑
z=K,L
σzit ln
xzit
x¯zI
.
4E.g. does writing a report add value to the paper it is printed on?
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A bar above a variable denotes a geometric mean; that is, Y¯I and x¯I , are the geometric means of output
and use of factor of production z in industry I. The variable σi = (σi + σ¯I)/2 is the average of the
factor share in firm i and the geometric mean factor share. The factor share of labour is based on wages.
Constant returns to scale are imposed by making capital the residual, so that
∑
z σz = 1. Again, a similar
measure iTFPvait based on V Ait instead of Yit is used.
As a third type of productivity measure I use traditional labour productivity measures defined as
LPit = ln(Yit/Lit) and similarly LPvait using value added V Ait instead of Yit. In all of the above
turnover and value added are brought to constant 2007 values using, respectively, sectoral level output
or value added prices from the EUKLEMS database (EUKLEMS (2009), for a description see O’Mahony
and Timmer (2009)). The labour input Lit is calculated as the number of full-time employees plus one
half times the number of part-time employees. Service sectors use part-time labour intensively and this
way of calculating the labour input leads to much more consistent values of turnover per employee over
time than using the total number of employees. Kit is capital stock obtained from capital acquisitions
and disposals using the perpetual inventory method; a detailed description can be found in the Appendix.
Wolff (1999) argues that in contrast to output, inputs are more easily measured in services sectors. He
suggests using indirect indicators of productivity growth in services based on changes in the input mix.
In particular for his study at the industry level he uses changes in the inter-industry coefficients, capital-
labour ratios, material-labour ratios and changes in the occupational composition in employment. This
is based on the observation that productivity growth in the goods-producing sectors has been associated
not only with higher output per unit of input but also with increasing capital-labour and material-labour
ratios. Changes in capital-labour ratios should be evident in levels as well. For this reason, I use the log
of the capital-labour ratio K/Lit as an alternative “productivity” measure. Changes in the occupational
composition would be another interesting indicator, however, in the dataset at hand the ratio of part time
to full time employees pt/ftit is the only labour-force-related indicator that can be constructed. To the
extent that this share is based on the firm’s needs more than on the employee’s convenience, it may reflect
uncertainties in the business environment. Table 9 in the Appendix shows the correlations between the
different productivity measures.
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3.4 Foreign presence and absorptive capacity
In equation (1) foreign presence (fpiIrt) is measured at the firm level. It is defined as employment in
foreign-owned firms (i.e. all firms whose ultimate beneficiary owner is located abroad) in NACE 3-digit
industry I and region r = R1, R2 at time t weighted by each firm i’s activity (employment share) in
regions 1 and 2 as follows:
fpiIrt =
∑
i∈FOIR1t
(Emplit)
(Total empl)IR1t
∗ activityiR1t +
∑
i∈FOIR2t
(Emplit)
(Total empl)IR2t
∗ activityiR2t. (2)
As spillovers tend to be localised the geographic dimension is important. Information on firm’s regional
activities in the dataset is available only at NUTS2 level, thus there are only two regions, namely the
Southeast region and the Border, Midlands and West region. The Southeast region includes Dublin; it
hosts roughly 90 per cent of foreign activity in the Irish services sectors.
As mentioned earlier, in addition to estimating equation (1) using foreign presence as defined above,
I also consider the domestic firms’ absorptive capacity. First, I define absorptive capacity as distance to
the technological frontier of the foreign-owned firms. In the literature different definitions of absorptive
capacity have been used. The measure absit used here is obtained by subtracting the domestic firm’s
productivity from the most productive foreign firm’s productivity in the same NACE 3-digit sector and
dividing by the most productive foreign firm’s productivity. This is in the spirit of Blalock and Gertler
(2009) as it has a straightforward interpretation, i.e. a value of .1 suggests that the particular domestic firm
is 10 per cent less productive than the most productive foreign firm in its 3-digit industry. The reference
(frontier) firm is the same as in Girma and Go¨rg (2007), and results are qualitatively similar if using median
productivity of the top quintile of foreign-owned firms in the same industry as the frontier group as do
An˜on Higon and Vasilakos (2011). For the two index-based measures of TFP (iTFPit and iTFPvait)
absorptive capacity is the absolute deviation from the most productive foreign-owned firm in the industry
as these measures take on positive and negative values. The regressions using this measure then include
the foreign presence term fpiIrt−1, the base effect of absorptive capacity absit−1 and an interaction term
between the two fpiIrt−1 × absit−1.
Second, I consider firms’ trading status as an indicator of absorptive capacity, I use both exporting
status and importing status. The argument is that trading firms have higher productivity than their
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non-trading counterparts. To capture this in the regression I interact the lagged foreign presence measure
fpiIrt−1 with the exporting status of the domestic firms in one case and with their importing status in
the second case. Thus, taking exporting status to illustrate this, I obtain two measures fpiIrt−1× expit−1
and fpiIrt−1× non-expit−1. The first term is equal to fpiIrt−1 when the domestic firm i is an exporter in
year t− 1 and the second term is equal fpiIrt−1 when the domestic firm i is not an exporter in year t− 1.
To examine potential differences in the ability of foreign-owned firms to generate spillovers, I group
the foreign-owned firms into four categories based on their country of origin.5 This is motivated by
evidence for the UK where subsidiaries of US multinationals have the greatest productivity advantage
relative to domestic firms, whereas subsidiaries of multinationals from the EU or other countries are on
par with British multinationals in the UK (Criscuolo and Martin, 2009). Here I distinguish between the
UK, the US, the EU156 (excluding the UK) and the remaining countries (ROW) and calculate separate
foreign presence measures as indicated in equation (2) for each of these groups. The UK and US are the
largest foreign investors in Ireland followed by the EU15 countries. The main investors from EU15 are
the Netherlands, Germany and France. Among the ROW group Switzerland, Canada and Japan are the
most prominent investors.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 shows the development of foreign presence in the five market-services sectors jointly and in each
broad sector individually. In wholesale and retail trade (G); transport, storage and communication (I)
and real estate, renting and business activities (K) a rather small share of foreign-owned firms accounts
for a substantial portion of employment and output. The shares of foreign presence in sectors H (hotels,
bars and restaurants) and O (other community, social and personal services) are much lower. In addition,
in these two sectors less than two per cent of firms are exporters making it nonsensical to use export
status as an indicator of absorptive capacity, I therefore exclude them from further analysis.
5Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) examine whether the owner’s origin matters for vertical spillovers in Romania.
6Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden.
12
Figure 1: Foreign presence in the services sectors
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for foreign presence shares and control variables
G, I & K G I K(excl. 70,71)
me sd me sd me sd me sd
fpiIrt 0.192 0.155 0.161 0.108 0.208 0.233 0.206 0.163
fpUKiIrt 0.069 0.071 0.078 0.075 0.058 0.087 0.048 0.046
fpUSiIrt 0.045 0.087 0.018 0.043 0.057 0.115 0.078 0.100
fpEU15iIrt 0.039 0.049 0.031 0.038 0.045 0.058 0.039 0.052
fpROWiIrt 0.018 0.050 0.012 0.019 0.037 0.104 0.015 0.042
impcompIt 0.243 0.267 0.126 0.202 0.084 0.067 0.548 0.187
ageit 2.472 0.704 2.539 0.688 2.391 0.716 2.295 0.743
HHIIt 0.049 0.073 0.035 0.039 0.114 0.161 0.067 0.084
∆indgrIt 0.073 0.257 0.058 0.246 0.016 0.196 0.145 0.311
Note: Regression sample before taking lags. The foreign presence measures for UK,
US, EU15 and ROW are calculated as in equation (2) for each country (group). EU15
excludes the UK. Import competition impcompIt is calculated as the share of imports
(c.i.f.) in domestic supply plus imports at basic prices by 2-digit NACE industry.
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Figure 1 suggests that foreign presence has been relatively stable over the 7-year period at this level
of aggregation. For the analysis foreign presence fpiIrt is calculated at the 3-digit industry level as in
equation (2). The means and standard deviations of this variable displayed in Table 1 show that there
is more variation at this level. The table also displays the relative shares of each of the four groups of
foreign investors. Overall the UK is the largest investor, followed by the US and the EU. In the business
activities sector (K (excl. 70,71)), however, the US is the largest foreign investor. Table 1 further shows
summary statistics for import competition and the remaining explanatory variables. Import competition
is much more important than foreign presence in the business activities sector, but less important in both
wholesale and retail trade (G) and transport, storage and communication (I).
Table 2 shows the differences in productivity between domestic and foreign-owned firms at the 25th,
50th and 75th percentile. For all productivity measures and in all sectors foreign-owned firms are more
productive than domestic firms. For brevity I do not report lengthy tables with Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests of first-order stochastic dominance which confirm that indeed the distribution of foreign-owned firms
stochastically dominates that of the domestic firms for nearly all productivity measures in each sector
and year individually (available on request). The only instances where first-order stochastic dominance
is not confirmed at the 10 per cent level or better is sector K in 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007 for the TFP
index based on value added iTFPvait. This confirms that there is potential for knowledge to spill over
from foreign to domestic firms. Foreign firms also use capital more intensively, but have lower shares of
part-time to full-time employees than domestic firms.
The entries for the different groups of foreign investors show that the different groups of foreign
investors cannot always be unambiguously ranked across productivity measures and sectors. When all
sectors are grouped together, the most productive firms tend to be EU15 or US firms. In sector G
subsidiaries of US companies are the most productive for all productivity measures. In sector I the
first rank tends to go to EU15 or ROW firms. In sector K (excl. 70,71) the differences in productivity
between the different groups of foreign-owned firms are smaller, as a result the ranking is much less
clear-cut. Subsidiaries of UK firms tend to be among the least productive foreign-owned firms across all
productivity measures and sectors.
Table 2 also shows summary statistics on the different dependent variables and the corresponding
measures of absorptive capacity (abs). For the estimated TFP measures and for the two labour pro-
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ductivity measures, the productivity gap to the most productive foreign firm in the same 3-digit industry
is between 16 and 19 per cent for all sectors jointly and for sectors G and I. In the business activities
sector K (excl. 70,71) the gaps are somewhat larger, domestic firms are 19 to 25 per cent less productive
than the most productive foreign firm in the same 3-digit industry. For the two index measures (iTFPit
and iTFPvait) the absorptive capacity measures are absolute deviations as these measures are centred
around the mean. These measures, in contrast, suggest that - on average - firms in sector K are closer to
the technological frontier than in the other sectors and in all sectors taken together.
Table 2: Productivity differences
G, I & K G I K(excl. 70,71)
p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75
eTFPit
dom 9.99 10.96 11.55 10.91 11.31 11.80 10.15 10.57 11.30 9.00 9.42 9.82
n-exp 9.95 10.91 11.47 10.87 11.24 11.70 10.11 10.51 11.22 8.96 9.39 9.78
exp 10.33 11.33 11.97 11.23 11.68 12.22 10.46 10.88 11.55 9.25 9.62 10.05
n-imp 9.71 10.79 11.44 10.90 11.28 11.78 10.11 10.51 11.21 8.97 9.39 9.77
imp 10.71 11.23 11.72 10.94 11.35 11.81 10.43 10.88 11.53 9.25 9.63 10.09
abs 0.10 0.18 0.26 0.08 0.16 0.22 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.32
for 10.03 11.23 12.09 11.22 11.76 12.47 10.69 11.57 12.39 9.24 9.73 10.51
UK 10.12 11.16 11.85 11.09 11.52 12.15 10.61 11.23 12.14 9.17 9.68 10.25
US 9.70 10.87 12.11 11.60 12.11 13.14 10.48 11.59 12.38 9.28 9.83 10.59
EU15 10.46 11.52 12.31 11.41 11.82 12.49 10.89 11.78 12.95 9.26 9.76 10.35
ROW 10.17 11.30 12.34 11.22 11.88 12.62 11.07 11.73 12.55 9.28 9.76 10.78
eTFPvait
dom 9.40 9.85 10.28 9.49 9.93 10.39 9.47 9.86 10.25 9.19 9.65 10.04
n-exp 9.36 9.81 10.22 9.44 9.88 10.30 9.45 9.84 10.23 9.16 9.64 10.03
exp 9.61 10.08 10.55 9.80 10.28 10.70 9.58 9.95 10.31 9.35 9.73 10.07
n-imp 9.32 9.77 10.18 9.39 9.82 10.26 9.45 9.84 10.21 9.17 9.65 10.04
imp 9.60 10.03 10.47 9.67 10.09 10.52 9.59 9.94 10.35 9.29 9.67 10.02
abs 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.10 0.15 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.27
for 9.72 10.25 10.90 10.13 10.62 11.17 9.81 10.33 11.21 9.32 9.82 10.25
UK 9.71 10.21 10.73 10.05 10.49 10.95 9.80 10.27 10.90 9.23 9.74 10.14
US 9.68 10.18 11.02 10.30 11.02 11.75 9.76 10.14 11.14 9.44 9.88 10.33
EU15 9.83 10.34 11.05 10.16 10.65 11.20 9.78 10.42 11.44 9.38 9.89 10.27
ROW 9.69 10.32 10.97 10.14 10.68 11.17 9.90 10.63 11.37 9.29 9.80 10.36
iTFPit
dom -0.65 -0.03 0.57 -0.64 -0.02 0.57 -1.00 -0.45 0.69 -0.49 0.04 0.54
n-exp -0.70 -0.06 0.53 -0.69 -0.05 0.54 -1.04 -0.51 0.65 -0.52 0.00 0.50
exp -0.42 0.15 0.74 -0.43 0.13 0.77 -0.70 -0.16 0.78 -0.30 0.22 0.68
n-imp -0.67 -0.04 0.56 -0.65 -0.01 0.59 -1.03 -0.50 0.64 -0.52 0.00 0.51
imp -0.60 -0.00 0.57 -0.63 -0.03 0.55 -0.83 -0.23 0.78 -0.31 0.20 0.70
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
G, I & K G I K(excl. 70,71)
p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75
abs 0.76 0.99 1.28 0.71 0.98 1.30 0.74 1.21 1.51 0.83 0.98 1.15
for -0.28 0.38 1.23 -0.33 0.34 1.08 -0.20 0.91 1.99 -0.24 0.30 1.13
UK -0.40 0.26 0.91 -0.53 0.14 0.72 -0.13 0.54 1.39 -0.28 0.33 1.06
US -0.17 0.47 1.51 -0.07 0.75 1.74 -0.53 0.97 1.82 -0.16 0.32 1.16
EU15 -0.20 0.45 1.46 -0.22 0.43 1.27 -0.12 1.26 2.68 -0.20 0.20 1.11
ROW -0.26 0.51 1.30 -0.29 0.51 1.14 -0.16 0.96 1.93 -0.33 0.26 1.39
iTFPvait
dom -0.61 0.01 0.59 -0.66 -0.03 0.58 -0.72 -0.13 0.55 -0.45 0.13 0.63
n-exp -0.64 -0.02 0.57 -0.70 -0.06 0.53 -0.74 -0.15 0.54 -0.45 0.12 0.64
exp -0.50 0.14 0.69 -0.51 0.17 0.76 -0.63 -0.05 0.55 -0.44 0.14 0.61
n-imp -0.65 -0.03 0.56 -0.76 -0.11 0.49 -0.74 -0.15 0.56 -0.44 0.13 0.65
imp -0.54 0.08 0.64 -0.53 0.09 0.68 -0.70 -0.08 0.45 -0.53 0.07 0.52
abs 0.75 0.99 1.31 0.74 1.01 1.34 0.79 1.06 1.40 0.74 0.94 1.19
for -0.16 0.42 1.08 -0.04 0.54 1.23 -0.04 0.59 1.65 -0.31 0.21 0.76
UK -0.24 0.37 0.96 -0.19 0.38 1.00 -0.10 0.56 1.25 -0.36 0.20 0.79
US15 -0.10 0.39 1.10 0.22 0.79 1.75 0.11 0.37 1.27 -0.22 0.24 0.76
EU -0.11 0.54 1.23 0.04 0.62 1.28 -0.03 0.90 1.97 -0.38 0.20 0.74
ROW -0.16 0.43 1.14 0.05 0.62 1.17 -0.04 0.57 1.84 -0.38 0.14 0.75
LPit
dom 11.54 12.08 12.64 11.95 12.35 12.86 11.38 11.83 12.54 10.96 11.40 11.80
n-exp 11.49 12.02 12.54 11.91 12.27 12.74 11.34 11.79 12.48 10.88 11.35 11.74
exp 11.84 12.47 13.12 12.29 12.77 13.32 11.70 12.08 12.77 11.31 11.68 12.09
n-imp 11.40 11.96 12.51 11.93 12.31 12.82 11.34 11.78 12.47 10.90 11.35 11.73
imp 11.86 12.32 12.85 11.98 12.40 12.90 11.66 12.11 12.77 11.34 11.72 12.17
abs 0.11 0.17 0.24 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.17 0.24 0.29
for 11.80 12.50 13.34 12.29 12.83 13.56 11.82 12.67 13.61 11.34 11.87 12.65
UK 11.74 12.36 13.09 12.17 12.58 13.24 11.78 12.39 13.36 11.23 11.72 12.31
US 11.70 12.54 13.51 12.61 13.24 14.36 11.52 12.73 13.48 11.42 11.92 12.76
EU15 11.99 12.69 13.46 12.45 12.92 13.56 12.12 12.77 13.85 11.44 11.92 12.61
ROW 11.87 12.55 13.50 12.29 12.98 13.73 12.30 12.99 13.59 11.30 12.02 12.92
LPvait
dom 10.23 10.70 11.17 10.11 10.57 11.02 10.41 10.82 11.21 10.48 10.99 11.37
n-exp 10.19 10.65 11.12 10.07 10.50 10.93 10.40 10.79 11.20 10.43 10.96 11.35
exp 10.54 10.99 11.38 10.43 10.94 11.36 10.56 10.94 11.26 10.71 11.10 11.45
n-imp 10.18 10.66 11.14 10.01 10.45 10.90 10.39 10.79 11.19 10.45 10.97 11.36
imp 10.35 10.79 11.22 10.31 10.73 11.18 10.55 10.93 11.33 10.67 11.08 11.43
abs 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.24 0.14 0.20 0.25
for 10.75 11.26 11.79 10.77 11.27 11.84 10.71 11.26 12.05 10.72 11.27 11.69
UK 10.68 11.13 11.59 10.73 11.13 11.61 10.71 11.13 11.73 10.63 11.13 11.49
US 10.86 11.36 12.04 10.99 11.67 12.44 10.59 11.10 11.99 10.86 11.33 11.74
EU15 10.77 11.30 11.90 10.77 11.30 11.87 10.79 11.35 12.54 10.78 11.29 11.73
ROW 10.71 11.31 11.94 10.70 11.28 11.85 10.84 11.60 12.13 10.67 11.19 11.87
K/Lit
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
G, I & K G I K(excl. 70,71)
p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75 p25 p50 p75
dom 7.56 8.45 9.38 7.48 8.40 9.36 8.08 9.26 10.23 7.63 8.37 9.09
n-exp 7.49 8.38 9.34 7.41 8.31 9.30 8.06 9.28 10.20 7.55 8.32 9.06
exp 8.00 8.73 9.52 7.95 8.75 9.56 8.38 9.24 10.41 8.04 8.62 9.24
n-imp 7.50 8.38 9.33 7.39 8.29 9.29 8.01 9.23 10.18 7.57 8.32 9.04
imp 7.74 8.59 9.48 7.66 8.54 9.45 8.43 9.51 10.61 8.04 8.69 9.32
for 7.82 8.65 9.48 7.81 8.70 9.52 7.74 8.47 9.38 7.90 8.68 9.47
pt/ftit
dom 0.00 0.08 0.50 0.00 0.16 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.20
n-exp 0.00 0.11 0.62 0.00 0.25 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.25
exp 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.10
n-imp 0.00 0.10 0.61 0.00 0.26 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.25
imp 0.00 0.07 0.33 0.00 0.09 0.40 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.11
for 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.05
Note: Regression sample before taking lags including the foreign-owned firms. EU15 excludes the UK. abs
refers to absorptive capacity measured as the difference in productivity between the most productive foreign
firm and each domestic firm relative to the productivity of the most productive foreign firm in the same
3-digit industry. For the two index-based productivity measures iTFPit and iTFPvait it is the absolute
difference in productivity between the most productive foreign firm and each domestic firm.
Table 3: Shares of exporters and importers by industry
exporters importers number of firms
2001 2007 2001 2007 2001 2007
G 0.15 0.16 0.37 0.41 3030 2561
I 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.19 575 370
K (excl. 70,71) 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.16 1379 1054
G, I & K 0.14 0.16 0.27 0.32 4984 3985
Note: Regression sample before taking lags.
Table 3 shows the shares of exporting and importing firms by sector for 2001 and 2007. In all
sectors there are more importers than exporters. The productivity measures in Table 2 confirm that
on average domestic exporters are more productive than domestic non-exporters. A similar observation
is true on the import side. The figures suggest than on average also domestic importers tend to be
more productive than domestic non-importers, however, there are more exceptions here. Unreported
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of stochastic dominance (available on request) confirm the existence of first-
order stochastic dominance of the various productivity measures for exporters over non-exporters for most
sectors, years and productivity measures. Exceptions are sector I for various productivity measures and
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sector K for the iTFPvait measure. For importers and non-importers the tests frequently do not reject
the null hypothesis that their productivity distributions are equal, especially in sectors I and K.
4.2 Estimation Results
Table 4 first shows the estimates of the effects of foreign presence when all three market-services sectors are
combined. The top panel shows the basic effect of foreign presence on domestic firms’ productivity. The
coefficients on foreign presence exhibit different signs for the different productivity measures, the signs on
the TFP index measures are positive, whereas they are negative on the other four productivity measures.
Only the coefficients for estimated TFP and labour productivity based on turnover are significant at the
10 and 5 per cent level, respectively. LPit is the only productivity measure for which there is a significant
effect from import competition. The control variables are largely insignificant.
When checking whether the absorptive capacity of the domestic firms matters using the distance-to-
frontier measure as in the second panel of Table 4, neither the coefficient on foreign presence nor the
coefficient on the interaction term with absorptive capacity is significant. The base effect of absorptive
capacity indicates that firms further away from the technological frontier are less productive in the case
of the turnover-based productivity measures. However, the opposite is true for the productivity measures
based on value added. The results where export and import status are used as alternative measures of
absorptive capacity do not suggest that the effects of foreign presence vary hugely by type of firm. The
negative effect of foreign presence on eTFPit and LPit from above is picked up by the non-exporters and
the non-importers only.
The results from splitting foreign presence do not suggest that country of origin matters for the
presence of spillover/competition effects for four out of the six conventional productivity measures. For
iTFPit and for K/Lit the results indicate that the effects from UK and US investment cancel each other
out. The negative effect on LPit is picked up by investment from the EU. The presence of subsidiaries
from EU15 countries seems to be associated with higher shares of part-time-to-full-time employees. To
summarize, there are few to no robust effects of foreign presence or import competition when looking
at the three services sectors jointly. The following results will show whether the absence of effects from
foreign presence is due to grouping the three rather different services sectors together.
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Table 4: Fixed effects panel regressions - sectors G, I & K(excl. 70,71) jointly
Dep. Var. eTFPit eTFPvait iTFPit iTFPvait LPit LPvait K/Lit pt/ftit
fpiIrt−1 -0.131(∗) -0.039 0.113 0.154 -0.146∗ -0.036 -0.163 0.262
(0.074) (0.139) (0.103) (0.156) (0.069) (0.138) (0.156) (0.240)
impcompIt−1 0.084 0.019 0.103 -0.012 0.169∗∗ 0.071 0.002 -0.138
(0.084) (0.146) (0.136) (0.183) (0.058) (0.137) (0.202) (0.172)
ageit−1 0.080(∗) -0.008 0.144∗ 0.065 0.044 -0.027 -0.242∗ -0.155
(0.043) (0.061) (0.065) (0.076) (0.040) (0.058) (0.108) (0.249)
HHIIt−1 0.113 0.072 0.042 -0.008 0.080 0.035 -0.112 0.096
(0.085) (0.166) (0.143) (0.218) (0.072) (0.158) (0.230) (0.161)
∆indgrIt−1 -0.004 -0.016 0.006 -0.018 0.007 -0.012 0.075∗ -0.036
(0.014) (0.024) (0.019) (0.027) (0.012) (0.024) (0.033) (0.043)
within-R2 0.039 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.020 0.001 0.076 0.002
Obs 14297 13719 14294 13719 14445 13863 14303 14274
Firms 6161 6017 6159 6017 6218 6075 6163 6120
fpiIrt−1 -0.153 0.028 0.108 0.194 -0.118 0.023
(0.105) (0.181) (0.101) (0.173) (0.085) (0.175)
absit−1 -0.242∗ 0.634∗∗ -0.017(∗) 0.001 -0.109 0.639∗∗
(0.100) (0.198) (0.008) (0.005) (0.100) (0.197)
fpiIrt−1 × absit−1 0.067 -0.444 0.005 -0.032 -0.135 -0.329
(0.451) (0.731) (0.025) (0.030) (0.349) (0.712)
impcompIt−1 0.082 0.079 0.078 0.039 0.164∗∗ 0.149
(0.085) (0.155) (0.137) (0.187) (0.059) (0.144)
within-R2 0.043 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.020 0.007
Obs 14058 12987 14056 12987 14246 13163
Firms 6049 5742 6048 5742 6119 5809
fpiIrt−1 × expit−1 -0.135 -0.240 0.184 -0.031 -0.122 -0.208 -0.211 0.215
(0.120) (0.177) (0.159) (0.214) (0.099) (0.170) (0.235) (0.172)
fpiIrt−1 × n-expit−1 -0.129(∗) 0.046 0.080 0.231 -0.156∗ 0.037 -0.142 0.284
(0.076) (0.148) (0.109) (0.166) (0.068) (0.146) (0.162) (0.278)
impcompIt−1 0.084 0.017 0.104 -0.013 0.169∗∗ 0.070 0.001 -0.138
(0.084) (0.145) (0.136) (0.182) (0.058) (0.136) (0.201) (0.172)
within-R2 0.039 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.020 0.002 0.076 0.002
fpiIrt−1 × impit−1 -0.091 0.077 0.146 0.269 -0.107 0.078 -0.150 0.277
(0.082) (0.146) (0.115) (0.170) (0.075) (0.144) (0.174) (0.175)
fpiIrt−1 × n-impit−1 -0.170(∗) -0.146 0.080 0.048 -0.182∗ -0.138 -0.176 0.247
(0.088) (0.172) (0.123) (0.189) (0.083) (0.170) (0.187) (0.321)
impcompIt−1 0.082 0.013 0.101 -0.018 0.166∗∗ 0.066 0.001 -0.139
(0.084) (0.146) (0.137) (0.183) (0.058) (0.137) (0.202) (0.175)
within-R2 0.040 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.020 0.002 0.076 0.002
fpUKiIrt−1 -0.163 -0.006 -0.416∗ -0.066 -0.178(∗) -0.003 0.678∗ -0.192
(0.122) (0.342) (0.190) (0.361) (0.106) (0.340) (0.298) (0.643)
fpUSiIrt−1 0.141 0.135 0.416∗ 0.370 0.026 0.059 -0.765∗∗ -0.039
(0.136) (0.242) (0.186) (0.276) (0.106) (0.237) (0.271) (0.277)
fpEU15iIrt−1 -0.278 -0.290 0.123 0.073 -0.390∗ -0.373 -0.423 1.070∗
(0.172) (0.248) (0.220) (0.300) (0.155) (0.246) (0.335) (0.519)
fpROWiIrt−1 -0.140 -0.090 0.541(∗) 0.242 -0.001 0.060 -0.462 -0.105
(0.196) (0.167) (0.278) (0.262) (0.127) (0.163) (0.364) (0.192)
impcompIt−1 0.086 0.020 0.104 -0.010 0.169∗∗ 0.071 -0.005 -0.126
(0.086) (0.149) (0.136) (0.186) (0.058) (0.138) (0.203) (0.168)
within-R2 0.040 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.021 0.002 0.078 0.002
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level in parenthesis; ∗∗, ∗, (∗) indicate significance at 1, 5, 10
per cent respectively. All regressions include the same controls as specified in the base regression in the top panel as well
as year dummies. If not specified, numbers of observations and firms are identical to those in top panel.
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Table 5: Fixed effects panel regressions - Wholesale and Retail (G)
Dep. Var. eTFPit eTFPvait iTFPit iTFPvait LPit LPvait K/Lit pt/ftit
fpiIrt−1 -0.048 0.075 0.286 0.360 -0.135 0.024 -0.710∗ 0.498∗
(0.088) (0.312) (0.183) (0.334) (0.083) (0.312) (0.284) (0.203)
impcompIt−1 -0.007 -0.113 -0.155 -0.213 0.026 -0.103 0.278 -0.101
(0.075) (0.190) (0.165) (0.234) (0.067) (0.188) (0.249) (0.117)
ageit−1 0.002 -0.042 0.086 0.044 -0.019 -0.054 -0.164 -0.101
(0.052) (0.092) (0.101) (0.120) (0.045) (0.088) (0.131) (0.153)
HHIIt−1 -0.168 -0.154 -0.584∗ -0.496 -0.057 -0.122 0.890(∗) 0.389
(0.123) (0.341) (0.288) (0.454) (0.114) (0.331) (0.463) (0.364)
∆indgrIt−1 0.024(∗) 0.004 0.003 -0.013 0.028∗ 0.005 0.038 -0.036
(0.014) (0.032) (0.021) (0.037) (0.014) (0.032) (0.031) (0.039)
within-R2 0.100 0.006 0.013 0.006 0.044 0.004 0.119 0.004
Obs 9253 8720 9251 8720 9316 8779 9253 9230
Firms 3854 3726 3853 3726 3866 3739 3854 3822
fpiIrt−1 -0.007 0.212 0.392(∗) 0.593 0.035 0.114
(0.117) (0.399) (0.235) (0.377) (0.118) (0.396)
absit−1 -0.167 0.781∗∗ -0.021 0.004 -0.052 0.778∗∗
(0.113) (0.253) (0.027) (0.005) (0.116) (0.256)
fpiIrt−1 × absit−1 -0.147 -0.368 -0.048 -0.072 -0.940∗ -0.252
(0.431) (0.977) (0.125) (0.069) (0.425) (0.977)
impcompIt−1 -0.016 -0.012 -0.215 -0.151 0.029 0.015
(0.076) (0.207) (0.166) (0.242) (0.067) (0.206)
within-R2 0.104 0.014 0.021 0.006 0.047 0.012
Obs 9091 8108 9089 8108 9179 8185
Firms 3796 3519 3795 3519 3815 3536
fpiIrt−1 × expit−1 -0.032 -0.036 0.348 0.252 -0.137 -0.089 -0.810(∗) 0.503∗∗
(0.124) (0.337) (0.302) (0.445) (0.105) (0.330) (0.461) (0.178)
fpiIrt−1 × n-expit−1 -0.056 0.124 0.257 0.407 -0.135 0.072 -0.664∗ 0.496∗
(0.096) (0.334) (0.197) (0.354) (0.091) (0.334) (0.303) (0.227)
impcompIt−1 -0.006 -0.117 -0.153 -0.217 0.025 -0.108 0.274 -0.101
(0.074) (0.190) (0.163) (0.233) (0.067) (0.188) (0.246) (0.117)
within-R2 0.100 0.007 0.013 0.006 0.044 0.004 0.119 0.004
fpiIrt−1 × impit−1 -0.061 0.199 0.290 0.509 -0.153(∗) 0.144 -0.741∗ 0.493∗
(0.091) (0.303) (0.188) (0.336) (0.087) (0.302) (0.297) (0.196)
fpiIrt−1 × n-impit−1 -0.025 -0.154 0.279 0.083 -0.103 -0.199 -0.654(∗) 0.507∗
(0.109) (0.396) (0.226) (0.418) (0.104) (0.398) (0.350) (0.246)
impcompIt−1 -0.007 -0.111 -0.155 -0.210 0.025 -0.101 0.278 -0.101
(0.075) (0.192) (0.165) (0.237) (0.067) (0.190) (0.249) (0.117)
within-R2 0.100 0.007 0.013 0.006 0.044 0.004 0.119 0.004
fpUKiIrt−1 -0.186 0.182 -0.513(∗) -0.172 -0.099 0.234 0.658 0.725∗
(0.136) (0.673) (0.274) (0.715) (0.127) (0.668) (0.416) (0.314)
fpUSiIrt−1 0.090 -0.343 0.492 0.007 -0.010 -0.382 -0.836 0.542
(0.170) (0.425) (0.437) (0.528) (0.152) (0.427) (0.710) (0.562)
fpEU15iIrt−1 -0.156 -0.148 0.343 0.330 -0.304(∗) -0.260 -1.073(∗) 0.694∗
(0.170) (0.421) (0.347) (0.515) (0.168) (0.416) (0.565) (0.338)
fpROWiIrt−1 0.478 -0.039 1.951(∗) 1.217 0.111 -0.237 -3.107(∗) 0.475
(0.320) (0.650) (1.033) (0.857) (0.259) (0.691) (1.730) (0.471)
impcompIt−1 -0.005 -0.089 -0.142 -0.178 0.025 -0.081 0.254 -0.113
(0.074) (0.188) (0.163) (0.237) (0.067) (0.185) (0.246) (0.118)
within-R2 0.101 0.007 0.016 0.006 0.044 0.004 0.122 0.004
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level in parenthesis; ∗∗, ∗, (∗) indicate significance at 1, 5, 10
per cent respectively. All regressions include the same controls as specified in the base regression in the top panel as well
as year dummies. If not specified, numbers of observations and firms are identical to those in top panel.
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Table 6: Fixed effects panel regressions - Transport, Storage and Communication (I)
Dep. Var. eTFPit eTFPvait iTFPit iTFPvait LPit LPvait K/Lit pt/ftit
fpiIrt−1 0.168 0.129 0.233 0.205 0.140 0.222 -0.120 -0.040
(0.182) (0.231) (0.221) (0.201) (0.205) (0.239) (0.374) (0.196)
impcompIt−1 0.978∗∗ 0.505 1.549∗∗ 1.105 0.860∗∗ 0.429 -1.074 0.578
(0.325) (0.553) (0.522) (0.677) (0.318) (0.545) (0.757) (0.630)
ageit−1 -0.007 -0.153 0.067 -0.076 -0.050 -0.159 -0.161 -0.125
(0.115) (0.127) (0.180) (0.198) (0.108) (0.123) (0.253) (0.177)
HHIIt−1 -0.134 -0.064 -0.018 0.063 -0.198(∗) -0.123 -0.326 0.096
(0.126) (0.307) (0.279) (0.421) (0.119) (0.294) (0.449) (0.193)
∆indgrIt−1 -0.002 -0.204 0.007 -0.211 -0.006 -0.225(∗) -0.033 0.177(∗)
(0.063) (0.127) (0.093) (0.139) (0.066) (0.129) (0.153) (0.099)
within-R2 0.087 0.031 0.063 0.023 0.052 0.026 0.063 0.007
Obs 1321 1295 1320 1295 1348 1322 1321 1314
Firms 664 658 663 658 674 668 664 643
fpiIrt−1 0.095 -0.121 0.239 0.167 -0.029 -0.079
(0.298) (0.380) (0.240) (0.477) (0.257) (0.335)
absit−1 -0.858∗ -0.331 -0.015 -0.155 -0.586 -0.334
(0.383) (0.848) (0.018) (0.140) (0.371) (0.764)
fpiIrt−1 × absit−1 0.328 1.726 -0.131 -0.042 0.791 1.819
(0.887) (1.742) (0.140) (0.459) (0.844) (1.539)
impcompIt−1 1.112∗∗ 0.477 1.459∗∗ 0.911 0.990∗∗ 0.408
(0.337) (0.662) (0.505) (0.645) (0.351) (0.680)
within-R2 0.106 0.038 0.080 0.036 0.058 0.033
Obs 1296 1250 1296 1250 1329 1283
Firms 646 635 646 635 657 646
fpiIrt−1 × expit−1 0.121 -0.352 0.210 -0.252 0.089 -0.294 -0.139 -0.138
(0.250) (0.405) (0.280) (0.302) (0.281) (0.430) (0.447) (0.212)
fpiIrt−1 × n-expit−1 0.195 0.308 0.245 0.375(∗) 0.168 0.408(∗) -0.110 0.016
(0.162) (0.212) (0.222) (0.212) (0.184) (0.213) (0.394) (0.218)
impcompIt−1 0.979∗∗ 0.520 1.550∗∗ 1.119(∗) 0.861∗∗ 0.446 -1.074 0.581
(0.325) (0.548) (0.523) (0.672) (0.317) (0.539) (0.758) (0.630)
within-R2 0.088 0.037 0.063 0.027 0.053 0.033 0.063 0.007
fpiIrt−1 × impit−1 0.095 -0.228 0.030 -0.307 0.108 -0.129 0.184 -0.028
(0.218) (0.194) (0.267) (0.201) (0.236) (0.206) (0.356) (0.155)
fpiIrt−1 × n-impit−1 0.239 0.356(∗) 0.428(∗) 0.531∗∗ 0.170 0.437∗ -0.414 -0.051
(0.165) (0.205) (0.237) (0.193) (0.201) (0.206) (0.487) (0.245)
impcompIt−1 0.976∗∗ 0.507 1.544∗∗ 1.108(∗) 0.859∗∗ 0.433 -1.067 0.578
(0.324) (0.548) (0.519) (0.668) (0.318) (0.540) (0.753) (0.630)
within-R2 0.089 0.035 0.066 0.030 0.053 0.030 0.067 0.007
fpUKiIrt−1 -0.068 0.015 -0.195 -0.070 -0.054 0.137 0.290 0.566
(0.220) (0.281) (0.350) (0.373) (0.247) (0.309) (0.655) (0.388)
fpUSiIrt−1 0.260 0.006 0.869 0.593 0.125 0.190 -1.322 0.403
(0.357) (0.528) (0.711) (0.785) (0.367) (0.540) (1.211) (0.778)
fpEU15iIrt−1 0.259 -0.253 0.656 0.342 0.131 -0.217 -0.769 0.379
(0.451) (0.499) (0.468) (0.603) (0.519) (0.530) (0.824) (0.685)
fpROWiIrt−1 0.069 0.042 0.259 0.279 0.002 0.134 -0.395 -0.218
(0.149) (0.188) (0.297) (0.322) (0.170) (0.187) (0.528) (0.234)
impcompIt−1 1.035∗∗ 0.501 1.649∗∗ 1.154(∗) 0.910∗∗ 0.434 -1.165 0.652
(0.320) (0.560) (0.532) (0.688) (0.313) (0.551) (0.785) (0.639)
within-R2 0.088 0.031 0.068 0.023 0.051 0.026 0.068 0.010
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level in parenthesis; ∗∗, ∗, (∗) indicate significance at 1, 5, 10
per cent respectively. All regressions include the same controls as specified in the base regression in the top panel as well
as year dummies. If not specified, numbers of observations and firms are identical to those in top panel.
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Table 7: Fixed effects panel regressions - business activities (K, excl. 70,71)
Dep. Var. eTFPit eTFPvait iTFPit iTFPvait LPit LPvait K/Lit pt/ftit
fpiIrt−1 -0.015 0.067 0.093 0.212 -0.089 0.007 -0.378(∗) -0.152
(0.106) (0.173) (0.143) (0.204) (0.098) (0.168) (0.209) (0.649)
impcompIt−1 0.573∗∗ 0.618∗ 0.546∗ 0.632 0.575∗∗ 0.608∗ 0.113 0.321
(0.183) (0.307) (0.272) (0.385) (0.171) (0.298) (0.412) (0.439)
ageit−1 0.115 -0.007 0.213∗ 0.119 0.074 -0.038 -0.094 -0.040
(0.076) (0.082) (0.087) (0.097) (0.074) (0.081) (0.211) (0.621)
HHIIt−1 0.205 0.138 0.189 0.115 0.187 0.135 0.278 0.351
(0.169) (0.274) (0.227) (0.330) (0.153) (0.263) (0.352) (0.532)
∆indgrIt−1 0.022 0.002 0.040 0.020 0.011 -0.005 0.033 -0.078
(0.030) (0.042) (0.037) (0.047) (0.027) (0.041) (0.084) (0.107)
within-R2 0.035 0.017 0.016 0.007 0.045 0.020 0.012 0.005
Obs 3723 3704 3723 3704 3781 3762 3729 3730
Firms 1664 1653 1664 1653 1700 1689 1666 1677
fpiIrt−1 -0.007 0.028 0.088 0.024 -0.038 0.023
(0.163) (0.297) (0.142) (0.232) (0.144) (0.289)
absit−1 -0.516∗ -0.149 -0.001 -0.041∗ -0.352 0.094
(0.204) (0.395) (0.003) (0.021) (0.226) (0.425)
fpiIrt−1 × absit−1 -0.185 0.137 0.011 0.087∗ -0.268 -0.180
(0.745) (1.692) (0.008) (0.037) (0.704) (1.745)
impcompIt−1 0.502∗ 0.592(∗) 0.501(∗) 0.706(∗) 0.496∗∗ 0.553(∗)
(0.206) (0.333) (0.288) (0.398) (0.186) (0.322)
within-R2 0.053 0.018 0.017 0.010 0.053 0.021
Obs 3671 3629 3671 3629 3738 3695
Firms 1628 1608 1628 1608 1669 1648
fpiIrt−1 × expit−1 0.032 -0.093 0.193 0.100 -0.027 -0.134 -0.513(∗) -0.271
(0.172) (0.256) (0.219) (0.306) (0.162) (0.241) (0.284) (0.479)
fpiIrt−1 × n-expit−1 -0.032 0.129 0.055 0.254 -0.113 0.062 -0.327 -0.106
(0.108) (0.181) (0.144) (0.215) (0.101) (0.177) (0.221) (0.727)
impcompIt−1 0.569∗∗ 0.630∗ 0.537∗ 0.641(∗) 0.569∗∗ 0.620∗ 0.125 0.332
(0.183) (0.307) (0.268) (0.388) (0.173) (0.296) (0.406) (0.447)
within-R2 0.035 0.017 0.016 0.007 0.046 0.021 0.012 0.005
fpiIrt−1 × impit−1 0.124 0.262 0.227 0.388(∗) 0.045 0.203 -0.368 -0.183
(0.139) (0.198) (0.182) (0.235) (0.123) (0.192) (0.246) (0.423)
fpiIrt−1 × n-impit−1 -0.095 -0.047 0.016 0.108 -0.163 -0.105 -0.384 -0.135
(0.124) (0.212) (0.163) (0.243) (0.121) (0.208) (0.240) (0.809)
impcompIt−1 0.554∗∗ 0.596(∗) 0.528∗ 0.613 0.559∗∗ 0.588(∗) 0.112 0.325
(0.183) (0.307) (0.268) (0.380) (0.174) (0.300) (0.411) (0.455)
within-R2 0.038 0.019 0.017 0.008 0.048 0.022 0.012 0.005
fpUKiIrt−1 0.372 0.003 0.742∗ 0.529 0.156 -0.177 -1.113(∗) -4.297
(0.280) (0.430) (0.368) (0.513) (0.277) (0.423) (0.610) (3.235)
fpUSiIrt−1 0.149 0.455 0.365(∗) 0.693(∗) 0.006 0.345 -0.696∗∗ -0.274
(0.160) (0.333) (0.209) (0.366) (0.137) (0.324) (0.266) (0.475)
fpEU15iIrt−1 -0.317 -0.282 -0.193 -0.127 -0.426 -0.342 -0.414 2.196
(0.312) (0.352) (0.386) (0.429) (0.278) (0.336) (0.460) (1.820)
fpROWiIrt−1 -0.209 -0.064 -0.440∗ -0.293 -0.070 0.001 0.623 -0.314
(0.170) (0.298) (0.219) (0.369) (0.175) (0.272) (0.387) (0.586)
impcompIt−1 0.589∗∗ 0.631∗ 0.558∗ 0.629(∗) 0.596∗∗ 0.628∗ 0.135 0.366
(0.175) (0.309) (0.258) (0.375) (0.162) (0.301) (0.381) (0.348)
within-R2 0.038 0.019 0.021 0.011 0.047 0.022 0.016 0.007
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level in parenthesis; ∗∗, ∗, (∗) indicate significance at 1, 5, 10
per cent respectively. All regressions include the same controls as specified in the base regression in the top panel as well
as year dummies. If not specified, numbers of observations and firms are identical to those in top panel.
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Tables 5-7 contain the same estimations as Table 4 for each of the three services sectors, namely
wholesale and retail trade (G); transport, storage and communication (I); and business activities (K,
excl.70,71) individually. For sector G we observe no significant effect of foreign presence for any of the
conventional productivity measures. Also the vast majority of control variables is insignificant. Among
the results for absorptive capacity based on distance to the frontier the interaction terms between foreign
presence and absorptive capacity is significant for LP as the dependent variable only indicating that
firms further away from the frontier benefit less from foreign presence. This is not confirmed by any
of the TFP measures, however. Splitting the foreign presence variable by export and import status as
alternative indicators of absorptive capacity yields no significant effects for either group in the case of the
conventional productivity measures. A similar observation holds when taking the origins of the foreign
investors into account in the definition of foreign presence.
Interestingly, for the input-based productivity measures there is a negative effect of foreign presence on
domestic firms’ capital-labour ratios and a positive effect on the share of part-time to full-time employees.
The negative effect on K/Lit is slightly higher - but not significantly so - for domestic exporters and
domestic importers compared to non-exporters and non-importers, respectively. The coefficients on pt/ftit
for traders and non-traders are also not significantly different from each other. Differentiating foreign
presence by the home country of the foreign subsidiaries suggests that the negative effects on the capital-
labour ratios is due to investment from the EU and the rest of the world, however these coefficients are
only significant at the 10 per cent level. The effect on the ratio of part-time to full-time employees appears
to be due to investment from the UK and the EU. Note also that this latter effect seems to be driven by
the retail sector (NACE 52) only as it disappears when this sector is excluded from the estimations for
sector G (estimation not reported).
For sector I (transport, storage and communication) there are no significant effects of foreign presence
on domestic firms’ productivity in the base model for any of the productivity measures (Table 6). However,
for all three turnover-based productivity measures there is a positive effect from import competition. In
terms of absorptive capacity, there is no significant effect from the distance-to-frontier measure. Yet non-
importers appear to benefit from foreign presence as measured by four out of six conventional productivity
measures. This effect is more marked for the productivity measures based on value added. Two of
the coefficients for non-exporters are also significant, but only at the 10 per cent level. It is may be
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worth noting that the effect of foreign presence on domestic non-importers is only significant for those
productivity measures where the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests described in Section 4.1 do not reject the
hypothesis that the productivity distributions of importers and non-importers in sector I are equal in
some or all of the years. Thus, this effect may not be productivity related.
As Table 7 shows, also in the business activities sector (K, excl. 70, 71) there is no significant effect
from foreign presence on domestic firm’s productivity. However, here there is a significant positive effect
from import competition for nearly all conventional productivity measures. For the iTFPva measure
the base effect of absorptive capacity indicates that firms further from the technological frontier are less
productive, but that they benefit more from foreign presence. Splitting foreign presence by trading status
does not yield any evidence of differential effects from foreign presence. For the iTFP measure the effect
from UK investors is positive whereas that from ROW investors is negative. There is a negative effect
on the capital-labour ratio of domestic firms which is significant only at the 10 per cent level. It affects
domestic exporters only and is driven by investment from the US and the UK.
Thus, overall the effects of foreign presence on the domestic firms in the same sector in Irish services
are limited. The absence of results when the three sectors are combined suggests that service sectors are
best looked at individually and some may even question whether the aggregation to NACE letter level used
here is appropriate.7 In one out of three services, namely transport, storage and communication, domestic
non-importers benefit from foreign presence. For the domestic firms in the wholesale and retail sector the
presence of foreign subsidiaries is associated with lower capital-labour ratios and higher shares of part-
time-to-full-time employees. This suggests that foreign presence in this sector creates a more uncertain
business environment for the domestic firms. There is suggestive evidence that capital-labour ratios are
also adversely affected by foreign presence in the business activities sectors. Indirect competition from
foreign firms via imports, in turn, is associated with higher productivity among domestic firms in two out
of three market services sectors (transport, storage and communications and the business activities.
From a methodological point of view, there is some indication that turnover-based measures of pro-
ductivity may lead to different conclusions compared to value-added based measures of productivity. The
results suggest that it input-based measures of productivity may provide complementary insights to those
obtained using standard output-based measures.
7Sample size in some of the sectors examined is already small, therefore I do not investigate this further.
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4.3 Robustness
In the present context two issues appear especially important in terms of robustness checks.8 One is
the measurement of foreign presence and the other is the sampling frame underlying the dataset. In the
remainder of this section I only describe results where they differ from those presented in Tables 5-7 and
their significance level is 5 per cent or better.
For the analysis above foreign presence is defined based on employment shares since these match the
activity shares in equation (2). Defining foreign presence based on employment in full-time equivalents
(i.e. full-time employees plus one-half the number of part-time employees) yields qualitatively and quant-
itatively very similar results to those presented. Instead, defining foreign presence based on turnover the
results differ somewhat more. In wholesale and retail trade (G) there are positive and significant coeffi-
cients for the two TFP index measures, these are picked up by non-exporters and importers.9 The base
effects of foreign presence are positive and significant when absorptive capacity is defined as distance to
the frontier except for eTFPva and LPva; the interaction term is negative and significant for only LP .
In transport storage and communication (I) the base effects in the top panel are significant for the three
productivity measures based on value added; this seems to be driven by subsidiaries of US multinationals.
The effect for non-importers is present for all output-based productivity measures; it also shows up for
non-exporters in the case of the two eTFP measures and for LP . In the case of business activities (K) the
effect on capital/labour ratios is still negative but no longer significant, instead the effect on the ratio of
part-time to full-time employees is positive and significant at the 10 per cent level. The effects of import
competition on domestic firms are not affected by the measurement of foreign presence in any of the three
sectors.
To check whether the different sampling probabilities for firms of different size matter, I split the
sample into firms with a median number of persons engaged of 20 or more and those below. For firms
with 20 or more persons engaged the sample is a census (bar non-response) of all firms. At this split
these larger firms account for 42-47 per cent of the underlying regression sample depending on the sector,
however, due to the sampling procedure, the regressions for the large firms are based on 53-57 per cent of
the observations in the full sample. This split reveals some differences between the two groups of firms,
8Results described in this section are available from the author on request.
9Also by exporters and by non-importers for iTFP and by US and EU15 investment.
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although in many cases it is variables that were significant at the 10 per cent level that turn insignificant
and vice versa.
In wholesale and retail (G) the effect of foreign presence is more likely to be positive (not significant)
for the large firms and more likely to be negative for the small firms (it is significant only for exporters
and for the base effect in the distance-to-frontier regression when eTV Pva and LPva are the dependent
variables). The negative effect on capital-labour ratios only affects the large firms. The increase in part-
time-to-full-time employees only affects the small firms, it is significant for exporters and importers only.
In transport, storage and communication (I) the effect of foreign presence is more likely to be negative
for the large firms (not significant) and more likely to be positive for the small firms (significantly so).
When splitting the sample, significant coefficients are only observed for the turnover-based productivity
measures. The negative effect among the larger firms applies to exporters and importers, whereas the
positive effect for the small firms applies to both traders and non-traders alike. The positive effect from
import competition is much stronger and significant in more cases in the small firm sample. In business
activities (K, excl. 70,71) the interaction between foreign presence and the distance-to-frontier absorptive
capacity measure is positive when iTFP is the dependent variable, but not for the iTFPva measure as in
the sample with all firms and the large firm sample. The negative effect on capital-labour ratios applies
to the large firms only where it does not distinguish between exporters and non-exporters or importers
and non-importers. The positive effect from import competition in this sector is significant only in the
large firm sample.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper I examine the effects of foreign presence and imports on domestic firms’ productivity in
three Irish market-services sectors. I take into account their absorptive capacity as well as differences in
foreign firms’ ability to generate spillovers. The effects differ across sectors: Indirect competition from
foreign firms via imports is associated with higher productivity of the domestic firms in the transport,
storage and communications and the business activities sector. There is evidence only for the transport,
storage and communication sector that one group of firms, namely domestic non-importers, benefit from
foreign presence. In the wholesale and retail sector the presence of foreign subsidiaries seems to create
a more uncertain business environment for the domestic firms as it is associated with lower capital-to-
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labour ratios and higher shares of part-time-to-full-time employees. Capital-labour ratios also seem to
be adversely affected by foreign presence in the business activities sectors. There is no coherent evidence
that the subsidiaries of a certain host country/region differ in their ability to generate spillovers.
From a methodological point of view the paper indicates that productivity measures based on value
added may lead to different conclusions than productivity measures based on output (sales), although
there is no clear evidence in favour of one or the other. More interestingly, input-based measures of
productivity yield complementary insights to output-based measures.
In terms of policy implications, the results at the very least raise a question mark over the policies
pursued and money spent to attract and keep the subsidiaries of foreign multinationals in Ireland. While
domestic firms benefit from import competition in two out of three market-services sectors, they benefit
from the presence of foreign-owned firms in only one sector, but are adversely affected in another. Thus,
production-related or other subsidies paid to the subsidiaries of foreign multinationals are not associated
with significant returns to the large majority of the domestic firm population.
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A Appendix
Data description
ageit One plus the difference between the current year and the year the firm was first recorded on the CSO’s
business register or the year of the first observation - whichever is smaller.
impcompIt Share of imports (c.i.f.) in total domestic supply at basic prices plus imports by 2-digit NACE industry.
Obtained from the tables entitled “Supply at basic prices by year, products and industries” published for
2001-2007 as part of the National Accounts by the CSO.
∆indtoIt Growth rate of turnover by industry as published by CSO from the ASI deflated using 2-digit level output
deflators from EUKLEMS (2009). Figures are mainly at the 3- and 4-digit level, in some instances at the
2-digit level. Where aggregates are not published at the same level of disaggregation in all years, they are
obtained from the dataset directly (using the grossing factors provided by CSO with the dataset). Growth
rates from figures obtained in this way are only used if they are larger than -.5 and smaller than 1, otherwise
the rate for the next level of aggregation is used.
HHIit Herfindahl-Hirschman index calculated as the sum of squared market shares [
∑
i∈I(Yit/YIt)
2] in each 3-digit
industry using the grossing factors provided by CSO with the dataset.
Kit Capital stock is calculated based on capital investments and disposals using the perpetual inventory method.
Starting stocks are obtained by breaking down previous year’s end of year industry-level capital stocks
obtained from CSO to the firm level using the firm’s share in industry-level fuel use. Capital acquisitions and
capital disposals are deflated using the implicit industry-level deflators from the industry-level capital stocks.
Depreciation rates are those underlying CSO’s calculations of industry level capital stocks (Central Statistics
Office, 2009). Assumed asset lives are as follows: 15 years service lives for machinery and equipment; 10
years for road freight vehicles and cars; 8 years for computers and office machinery; 55 years for buildings in
wholesale and retail trade and hotels and restaurants (G, H), 50 years for buildings in transport and business
activities (I, K), 30 years for buildings in personal services (O); and 5 years for software. Industry-level
depreciation rates are obtained by weighting the CSO’s depreciation rates for each asset by industry-mean
asset shares in total capital acquisitions that are reweighted to add up to 1 (available from 2003 only). This
amounts to depreciation rates of 0.1790 for sector G, 0.1348 for sector H, .2197 for sector I, .2451 for sector
K and .1668 for sector O. Capital disposals are not deducted in the first year the firm is observed. No
depreciation is applied in years when the firm is not observed.
Lit Number of employees in full-time equivalents calculated as the number of full-time employees plus 1/2 times
the number of part-time employees.
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V Ait Value added deflated to constant 2007 values using value-added deflators at the 2-digit level obtained from
EUKLEMS (2009). Value added is defined by CSO as turnover - purchases for direct resale + opening stock
- closing stock - purchases of other goods (which include postage, utilities bills, stationary, insurance, rent,
royalties, catering services, travel expenses, depreciation and other business activities).
Yit Turnover deflated to constant 2007 values using output deflators at the 2-digit level obtained from EUKLEMS
(2009).
Table 8: Means and standard deviations of the main variables across different samples
Domestic firms in sectors Domestic firms in
G, I, K (excl. 70,71) regression sample
weighted unw weighted unw
turnover 2.443(28.59) 8.906(67.07) 4.352(40.94) 11.88(78.88)
capital stock 0.197(7.936) 0.794(18.58) 0.337(10.35) 0.950(19.72)
employment 10.29(120.0) 35.80(284.9) 17.45(167.1) 46.19(325.3)
empl. in full-time equiv. 9.013(95.82) 31.03(226.7) 15.19(129.8) 39.75(251.3)
exporters 0.092(0.289) 0.136(0.343) 0.103(0.304) 0.155(0.362)
importers 0.209(0.407) 0.274(0.446) 0.236(0.424) 0.301(0.458)
avg. no. of obs. per year 34254 6109 16045 4237
Note: Note: Turnover and capital stock in millions of constant 2007 Euros. Domestic firms
are all firms that are never foreign-owned in any of the years observed. Regression sample
as described in Section 3.1.
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Table 9: Correlation coefficients between productivity measures
eTFPit eTFPvait iTFPit iTFPvait LPit LPvait K/Lit pt/ftit
G, I & K (excl. 70, 71)
eTFPit 1.0000
eTFPvait 0.4395 1.0000
iTFPit 0.4554 0.3580 1.0000
iTFPvait 0.1919 0.7507 0.7001 1.0000
LPit 0.9252 0.4842 0.4574 0.1394 1.0000
LPvait 0.1559 0.9199 0.2667 0.6644 0.3243 1.0000
K/Lit 0.0224 -0.0017 -0.6363 -0.6102 0.2274 0.1447 1.0000
pt/ftit -0.0992 -0.1252 -0.0381 -0.0231 -0.1532 -0.1442 -0.1250 1.0000
G
eTFPit 1.0000
eTFPvait 0.4179 1.0000
iTFPit 0.6940 0.3016 1.0000
iTFPvait 0.2776 0.7732 0.6564 1.0000
LPit 0.9724 0.3988 0.5156 0.1244 1.0000
LPvait 0.4199 0.9924 0.2194 0.6939 0.4295 1.0000
K/Lit 0.0319 -0.0189 -0.6590 -0.6140 0.2644 0.1040 1.0000
pt/ftit -0.1769 -0.1597 -0.0556 -0.0583 -0.1924 -0.1703 -0.0929 1.0000
I
eTFPit 1.0000
eTFPvait 0.4780 1.0000
iTFPit 0.8356 0.3500 1.0000
iTFPvait 0.5080 0.7423 0.7452 1.0000
LPit 0.9736 0.4840 0.6904 0.3632 1.0000
LPvait 0.4172 0.9773 0.1893 0.5866 0.4714 1.0000
K/Lit -0.2548 -0.0436 -0.7344 -0.6861 -0.0277 0.1687 1.0000
pt/ftit -0.1073 -0.0400 -0.0091 0.0503 -0.1400 -0.0654 -0.1240 1.0000
K (excl. 70, 71)
eTFPit 1.0000
eTFPvait 0.7508 1.0000
iTFPit 0.8061 0.6114 1.0000
iTFPvait 0.5683 0.7873 0.8264 1.0000
LPit 0.9354 0.6971 0.5677 0.3282 1.0000
LPvait 0.7342 0.9709 0.4729 0.6305 0.7664 1.0000
K/Lit 0.0631 0.0369 -0.5291 -0.5814 0.3955 0.2625 1.0000
pt/ftit -0.1862 -0.1607 -0.0486 -0.0164 -0.2279 -0.1929 -0.1857 1.0000
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